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Abstract
This article explores the relationship between language, experience, 
and the body. Employing a phenomenological approach that takes 
the sensory body as its starting point, it focuses on three instances of 
‘divine experience’, looking at the ways in which social actors seek 
to express that experience through metaphorical translation into 
more familiar, everyday realms. It argues that within this perceptual 
process – which starts in bodily experience and ends in words – both 
bodies and worlds are formed: bodies open to (often sensory) aspects 
of divine experience, and worlds that include the divine, alongside 
instances of divine agency. Indeed, such bodily conceptual and lin-
guistic work is, social actors claim, the product of divine agency. At 
the heart of the three instances of divine experience explored here 
rests the issue of ‘new birth’, itself a metaphorical move employed to 
express a phenomenon in which the body appears to be transformed 
into something new, namely a habitation of divine presence. As such 
presence ‘bubbles up’ from within, it sometimes ‘overflows’ in words. 
The body speaks. Alongside exploring the metaphorical moves em-
ployed to express this type of bodily experience, this article raises the 
ontological question of what kind of body it is, in such cases, that is 
speaking, thus providing a phenomenologically inflected response 
to recent ‘ontological’ debates within anthropology.
Keywords: body; phenomenology; senses; Christian experience; metaphor; 
ontology; ‘ontological turn’; language; being; new birth; auto-ethnography.
‘And there was a guy called Mr Harrison,’ Dave says, ‘who was one of the 
older men there. He was probably about your age, about fortyish. He just 
said, ‘God is speaking to some people in this room this morning and you 
just need to know that this is how you respond to him.’ And he gave one 
or two headlines as to what to do. And I responded in accordance to what 
he said, really. And I felt then as though I’d got struck by lightning. These 
guys came running across the room, laid hands on me – young, enthusiastic 
guys about my own age, really. And, yeah... I just think that my life was 
completely radicalised within.’
‘So did you feel that you got struck by lightning in your response to Mr 
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Harrison, or when these guys laid hands on you?’ I ask.
‘It was as their hands landed on my head, I think.’
‘Right, right. So, it was something quite... physical, as well as spiritual, you 
think?’
‘Yeah,’ Dave responds but he doesn’t sound convinced, ‘yeah…’
This fragment of dialogue is taken from a larger conversation between my 
father-in-law, Dave Webb, and me, recorded in late 2011 during a period of 
anthropological fieldwork.1 The purpose of the interview was to explore the 
story of Dave’s life, with a particular focus on the events and experiences 
that had played a significant part in shaping him into who he is today. In 
this part of the conversation Dave is describing his conversion, an event 
which had taken place some thirty-eight years previously, in the summer 
of 1973. So far in the interview, Dave has described his childhood and 
young adulthood growing up in the north of England. He has spoken of 
how, from his earliest recollections, church and community life were inter-
woven in the lives of his extended working-class family; how, at the age of 
twenty-one, his curiosity about God was awakened through the seemingly 
miraculous transformation of the local church minister following a visit to 
some nearby ‘revival’ meetings; and, finally, he has traced his arrival at a 
Christian Endeavour holiday centre in North Wales where he is attending 
one of the early morning prayer meetings where the events described in 
the conversation above take place. In this meeting, as Dave responds to Mr 
Harrison’s instructions – or perhaps, more precisely, as the hands of the two 
young men land on his head – he experiences something extraordinary. ‘I 
felt then as though I’d got struck by lightning,’ he says, expanding on his 
description by adding, ‘I just think that my life was completely radicalised 
within.’ Dave expresses to me, in words, a highly significant event drawn 
from the lived experience of his life.
1  This 18-month ethnographic fieldwork was part of an Economic and Social Research 
Council-funded doctoral project (grant number ES/I900934/1), based in the southern Balkans 
and looking at Christian experience. The research was auto-ethnographic in nature, being 
situated amongst the network of relationships that had emerged for me since moving to Greece 
as part of an ‘apostolic team’ in 1998 (for an in-depth account, see Barnes 2015). This interview 
was recorded in the lounge of our rented house in the north of Albania, in the city of Shkodër, 
where part of the project was based. It was later transcribed to produce the materials used here. 
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The exploration of the relationship between language and experience has 
a long history in anthropology (e.g. Whorf 1956; Needham 1972; Classen 
1993; Csordas 1990, 1994, 1997; Coleman 1996), with anthropologists inter-
ested both in how language shapes experience (e.g. Stromberg 1993, Geurts 
2003) and in how experiences are shaped into language (e.g. Bruner 1986; 
Turner 1985). Despite this extensive work, Desjarlais and Throop (2011), 
in their recent review of phenomenological, experience-based approaches, 
highlight a lack of due attention given to adequately addressing ‘linguistic, 
discursive, or semiotic forces’ (2011, 97). To rectify this, they suggest future 
trajectories of these studies might embrace deeper explorations of the re-
lationship between the phenomenal and the discursive, ‘between, that is, 
experience, being, and sensate perception, on the one hand, and language, 
aesthetic and rhetorical forms, and communicative practices more generally 
on the other’ (Ibid.). Similarly, Porcello, Meintjes, Ochoa and Samuels (2010), 
in their recent review of anthropological explorations of sensorial aspects 
of experience, come to the same conclusion. Although citing some notable 
exceptions (e.g. Classen 1993; Stoller 1997; Csordas 1994, 1997; Engelke 
2007; Geurts 2003), they argue that, as with phenomenological studies more 
generally, ‘a recurring feature in the anthropology of the senses is its rejec-
tion of language, discourse, and semiotics as modes for encountering and 
understanding the sensuous cultural world’ (2010, 59).
Taking a cue from these challenges, in this article I seek to speak into 
the obscure space where language meets experience. As such, I employ a 
phenomenological approach that takes the experiencing body as its start-
ing place (Csordas 1990; Merleau-Ponty 1962). Thomas Csordas (1990), in 
his seminal article on embodiment, drawing on the work of Merleau-Ponty 
(1962) and Hallowell (1955), directs us towards the body as the ‘existential 
ground of culture’ (Csordas 1990, 5). Whilst bringing into question a frame-
work built around the notion of ‘culture’, I build on Csordas’s key insight 
that experiences in the body form the existential ground upon which differ-
ent ways of being-in-the-world are formed. Through examining my father-
in-law’s and my own conversion experiences, I argue, along with Csordas, 
that pre-objective, deeply felt bodily sensation indeed plays a significant 
role in constituting one’s lived world. In contrast to Csordas, however, and 
in large part due to my own ontological positionality in relation to the ‘that-
which-is’, I feel no need to reduce such instances of divine experience to 
mere products of the ‘socially informed body’ (1990, 23). In this respect my 
work builds on recent ‘ontological’ challenges (Henare, Holbraad & Wastell 
2007; Alberti et al. 2011; Holbraad 2012) to take radically different domains 
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of experience seriously or, in Blaser’s words, to recognise ‘ontologies in 
their own terms’ (2009a, 890).
In his phenomenological work on embodiment Thomas Csordas builds 
on Merleau-Ponty’s observation that perception starts in the body and ‘ends 
in objects’ (cited in Csordas 1990, 9), rather than the other way around. Ex-
perimenting with the implications of this line of thought, I also argue that 
out of pre-objective Christian conversion experiences new ‘objects’ (new 
bodies and new worlds) emerge. If the body is, as Merleau-Ponty states, a 
‘certain setting in relation to the world’ (1962, 303), then the Christian body 
is a particular type of setting in relation to a particular type of world. As such, 
conversion (for the converted) is often experienced as a significant landmark 
event in which the body is transformed into something new and within 
which new spiritual sensitivities emerge, ‘opening out’ towards domains 
of divine experience that appear, previously, to have been perceptually 
obscured (see James 1982[1902]). It may be useful, from both an emic and 
an etic perspective, to speak about these spiritual sensitivities through the 
notion of the ‘spiritual senses’, as has often been done historically within 
the Western Christian tradition (Gavrilyuk & Coakley 2012). However, I 
argue that a more fruitful approach lies in appreciating the metaphorical 
moves that social actors make in translating experiences from one domain 
into another, something that I explore in relation to my own experiences 
and expressions of divine experience, alongside Dave’s. Finally, I put both 
into dialogue with articulations of divine experience recorded in the gospel 
stories, further showing how distinctive worlds become convincing to social 
actors as they compare their own experiences with these other accounts. 
In relating language to experience this article explores two issues, the first 
linguistic, the second ontological. Firstly, what are the dynamics involved, 
the methods (many of them, I argue, metaphorical) by which the speaking 
body articulates certain aspects of its experience? And secondly, where 
social actors articulate aspects of what might be called ‘divine experience’, 
what kind of body is it, in such cases, that is speaking?
The sensing body
My starting point here is a phenomenological event, by which I mean the 
collection of experiences that Dave has described above and which acted 
to set his life on a new course. In this, I do not mean to say that I know 
exactly what happened to Dave in that early morning prayer meeting 
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back in 1973. Here, I am reliant upon his description.2 But what I do mean 
to say is that I am willing to take seriously the fact that something very 
significant did happen. It was, I believe, the event itself (interwoven with 
Dave’s subsequent descriptions of that event)3 that changed the course of 
his life. Seemingly, what happened to Dave during this event was highly 
sensory in nature. He employs sensory terminology in order to convey 
his experience – he felt he got struck by lightning. At this point in the 
interview, I press him for further explanation. What I want to know is 
how embodied and concrete the experience really was; ‘[What you felt] 
was something quite... physical, as well as spiritual, you think?’ What I 
am trying to get at is whether Dave’s experience was something vague 
and insubstantial, two characteristics which might, I imagine, be associ-
ated with the ‘spiritual’, or whether it was, by contrast, something quite 
substantial and real, something he felt in his body.
Despite subtly rejecting my categorisation of his experience (as ‘physical’, 
as well as ‘spiritual’), Dave appears to affirm the implicit notion behind my 
question in his subsequent description:
…yeah. I always described it as, when I was a kid, we used to collect stickle-
backs in jam jars and put them on the shelf, on the window ledge outside the 
house. And it was great for a day or two, but then you would lose interest 
in them, and your mother would be saying, ‘Can you clear this up.’ And 
eventually you realise you’d better clear it up, and there was a jam jar full 
of dead fish and green slime. And then, as you put it under the tap outside 
in the garden, you put the tap on, all of this slime just came out of you, and 
it would sort of peel off, this green film which had attached itself to the jam 
jar, and you’d be left with a clean jar. I think that’s what I felt happened.
As mentioned, when pressed to label his experience as ‘quite… physical’ 
Dave appears to gently resist. Why is this? Is Dave, in his momentary 
pause, reflecting a longstanding western dualism between the immate-
rial spirit and the material body (Gavrilyuk & Coakley 2012, 3)? In other 
words, is he reluctant to describe what happened to him as ‘physical’ 
because God is Spirit and an encounter with Spirit should not be reduced 
to something ‘physical’? If so, it might have been better for me to avoid 
any physical/spiritual categorisation altogether, and to ask if what he 
experienced had been something that he had felt in his body. If I had, I 
2  See Stromberg (1993) for a fuller exploration of the issues surrounding this problem.
3  This being the focus of Stromberg’s (1993) argument.
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strongly suspect that he would have responded affirmatively. Both his 
descriptions imply that what Dave experienced, he experienced in the 
body, his metaphors being highly evocative of deeply felt bodily sensa-
tion. As lightning might be felt as an electrifying shock or as a powerful 
jet of water might be felt exploding upon and cleansing an inner surface, 
so Dave feels the Spirit’s intrusion deep within his own being. His resist-
ance to labelling this experience as ‘physical’, I would therefore suggest, 
springs from a tacit resistance to the reduction of what kind of being he 
is and the elision of the ontological landscape he inhabits. For Dave, as 
for many other Christians, his ontology, his landscape of that-which-is 
extends well beyond the physical. Likewise, for Dave, as for many other 
Christians, the experiencing body is not merely a physical entity but is, 
rather, infused with and constituted by Spirit, with conversion often being 
experienced and conceived as the point at which this infusion takes place 
(Mealey 2012; Gavrilyuk & Coakley 2012, 16; Coleman 1996). 
The new body: Being and perceiving
From an anthropological perspective Simon Coleman describes how in 
the logic of incarnation the Christian mind and body are understood as 
being ‘colonized by the transcendent world of the Spirit’ (Coleman 1996, 
111). The metaphors that a person experiencing conversion might employ 
are likely to be slightly different – the mind and body being ‘brought to 
life’ through the permeation of the Spirit’s breath, or the experience of 
the Spirit as life-giving water ‘bubbling up’ from a deep internal spring. 
But the issue is the same – new birth is something to do with the Spirit 
emerging, settling, or dwelling within the human person. Alongside this, 
in what at first appears to be a paradoxical statement, Lindquist and Cole-
man suggest that the Christian ‘believer’ does not really ‘believe’ in the 
existence of God. ‘For the believer,’ they explain, ‘the existence of God is 
not “believed” but “perceived”’ (Lindquist & Coleman 2008, 5, drawing on 
Pouillon 1982[1979]), with conversion often marking the opening up of this 
previously perceptually-obscured sphere.4 Through Christian conversion, 
therefore, a transformation occurs both in being (what one ontologically 
is) and in perceiving (what one is able tangibly to sense or perceive), the one 
being intimately interwoven with the other. The body, through the Spirit’s 
infusion and indwelling, is transformed into something new, being also 
4  Indeed, it is the startled apprehension of this previously obscured landscape that appears, 
in part, to so powerfully invade Dave’s life during this event.
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endowed with new sensory capacities ‘opening out’ towards non-physical 
realities in new ways.5
The idea that the body’s sensory apparatus might extend beyond the 
physical senses is not something new in Christian experience and thought 
(Gavrilyuk & Coakley 2012). Origen of Alexandria, living in the second and 
third centuries, is credited as the first to coin the expression ‘spiritual senses’ 
(sensus spiritales) to refer to those parts of the sensorium that extend beyond 
purely physical human perception (Ibid., 2–4; Vinge 1975 cited in Howes 
2009, 18). Augustine, two centuries later, believed that it was through such 
spiritual senses that ‘God and God’s activity in the world’ could be discerned 
(Lootens 2012, 56). And in the 1700s John Wesley specifically associated 
conversion with an ‘opening of the spiritual senses’ by which the divine 
began to be perceived (cited in Mealey 2012, 253). Aristotle, Classen tells 
us (1993, 2), numbered the senses as five. Many early Christian authors in 
the West, following Aristotle, developed their notions of the spiritual senses 
around an idea of there being five spiritual senses which worked in a way 
‘analogous to but not reducible to ordinary sense perception’ (Gavrilyuk 
& Coakley 2012, 3). Thus, Augustine wrote of how he ‘tasted’ God and was 
‘touched’ by him, found him ‘fragrant’, and spoke of how God ‘shattered 
[his] deafness’ and ‘put to flight [his] blindness’ (from his Confessions, cited 
in Gavrilyuk & Coakley 2012, 3).
However, much contemporary anthropological work on the senses 
problematises local assumptions about the numbering and ordering of the 
senses. Kathryn Geurts convincingly argues that the commonly held Euro-
American notion of there being five senses is itself merely a historically, 
socially, and culturally constructed ‘folk ideology’ (2003, 7). She points out 
that if, in accordance with contemporary scientific logic, the qualification 
for something being categorised as a sense is that it possesses a correspond-
ing physical ‘organ’ (e.g. the ear for hearing, the nose for smelling, the skin 
for touching etc.) then balance, which has such a corresponding ‘organ’ 
(the vestibular organ of the inner ear), should also be labelled as a sense 
(Ibid., 4). Not stopping at balance, late twentieth century sensory scientists, 
Geurts tells us, ‘would probably agree on a taxonomy of approximately 
nine sensory systems’ (Ibid., 8). David Howes, quoting Durie, points out 
that the more materialist scientists ‘study the structure of our sense organs, 
5  Within this ontology of the body, materiality and immateriality, as categories to think 
with, slide into the background. If materiality is understood as that which reveals itself to the 
senses (Tilley 2004), that which can be sensed, then the Spirit, in these terms and to the body 
described here, is also material.
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the more senses we appear to have’ (Durie 2005, 35 cited in Howes 2009, 
23), conservative estimates putting the number at ten, more radical ones 
estimating it as high as thirty-three (Ibid.).
If contemporary neuroscience unsettles commonly held assumptions 
about the sensorium, cross-cultural explorations of sensory orders further 
reveal the contingent nature of our own understandings. The ‘anthropol-
ogy of the senses’ (e.g. Classen 1993; Classen & Howes 1996; Classen 1999; 
Howes 2009; Classen, Howes & Synnott 1994) has, in large part, done this 
through showing how different people in different places and at different 
times number and order the senses in a vast variety of different ways. One 
thing that emerges from this body of work is that local sensory orders re-
flect indigenous ‘ethno-ontologies’, local experiences and understandings 
of what exists and is valued in the world that might be sensed (see Geurts 
2003). In thinking about Christian experience this is where the notion of 
the ‘spiritual senses’ finds, at least from an emic perspective, its ontological 
appeal. It locates in the body (even if we leave open our understandings of 
what the body actually is) senses capable of perceiving aspects of reality 
beyond those apprehended through more narrowly constructed sensoriums. 
In appealing to the senses a Christian implies two things, both ontological 
and each reflecting the other. The first concerns the nature of the world that 
he or she inhabits, and the second concerns what kind of being he or she is 
inhabiting that world. If perception, as Merleau-Ponty has argued, starts 
in the body and ends in objects (cited in Csordas 1990, 9) or ‘things’, the 
Christian puts his or her particular mark on the world by proclaiming that 
what he or she has sensed in the body is God, and in so doing constructs 
not only the world perceived but also the body that perceives it. In other 
words, the Christian’s inhabited world and body (like every other inhabited 
world and body) emerge out of perception.
Speaking
‘[T]he goal of a phenomenological anthropology of perception,’ Csordas 
writes (1990, 9), ‘is to capture that moment of transcendence in which 
perception begins, and, in the midst of arbitrariness and indeterminacy, 
constitutes and is constituted by culture.’ Dave’s lightning experience seems 
just one such transcendent moment, a vivid experience, a moment of ‘ex-
istential beginnings’ in Csordas’s terms, something he experienced, quite 
powerfully I have suggested, in his body. But what exactly does Csordas 
mean here by ‘culture’? Elsewhere he speaks of the ‘socially informed body’ 
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(1990, 23), locating this as the site through which perception emerges. The 
idea, of course, is that the body is located and embedded and has a locally 
constituted habitus through which experience in the body is reflectively 
objectified. By inference, the words ‘social’ and ‘culture’ highlight the role 
of human others in this process, something which may, in fact, obscure 
other formative dynamics within perceptual processes. As such, I would 
suggest a slightly broader reading. Alongside ‘culture’, I would suggest 
that a being’s perception is constituted by its experience-thus-far-of-life-in-
the-world, including the vast array of material environments within which 
it has grown and been grown and that have played their part in shaping its 
‘perceptual orientation’ (Ingold 2000a, 144).
At the point that Dave is ‘struck by lightning’ and takes it to be God, he re-
veals at least two aspects of his experience-thus-far-of-life-in-the-world, namely, 
that he knows what lightning is and can at least imagine what it feels like to 
be struck by it (either through experiences of his own or through relating to 
the experiences of others); and secondly, that he has an (also undoubtedly 
socially constituted) conception of a being called ‘God’. However, what is of 
note here is that, in seeking to express his experience (Bruner 1986; Dilthey 
1976), Dave makes no appeal to any language of the ‘spiritual senses’. Nor 
does Augustine, as the statement quoted above demonstrates. Both simply 
employ the language of the common senses, and leave implicit the fact that 
when, for instance, Augustine speaks of ‘tasting’ God, he is not referring 
to the stimulation of taste buds within his mouth. Likewise, Dave told me 
he felt as if he had been struck by lightning, leaving the interpretation of 
what he meant by that to me. And this brings us to an interesting point. The 
notion of the ‘spiritual senses’, although appealing in that, by extending a 
corporeal sensorium, it appears to give us a framework and language to 
talk about aspects of divine experience not easily conceptualised through 
more narrow conceptions, nonetheless remains, within Western thought, 
closely linked to a fivefold sensory model. 
As we have seen through the work of Geurts and others, reifying this 
fivefold model as ontologically pre-existent is itself problematic, because 
sensoriums vary from place to place. This in itself should make us extremely 
cautious about reifying an extended tenfold model based on five ‘corporeal 
senses’ and five ‘spiritual’ ones, a point to which Christian thinkers have 
themselves been sensitive. Recognising no tangible ‘spiritual sense organs’ 
comparable to the more visible ‘corporeal sense organs’ has, for many, 
brought the strict delineation of five spiritual senses into question (LaNave 
2012, 165; Rahner cited in Gavrilyuk & Coakley 2012, 5). Origen himself 
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spoke of ‘one divine sense’, but went on to speak of the ‘many forms of that 
sense’ (McInroy 2012, 25, my italics). Karl Rahner, in a seminal article writ-
ten in the 1930s, at first expounded a doctrine of the spiritual senses closely 
analogous to five physical senses, but in his later work considered such a 
strict division ‘rather forced’, preferring instead to emphasise ‘the unitive 
character of spiritual perception’ (Gavrilyuk & Coakley 2012, 4f.). What, 
then, is happening when Christians, such as Dave or Augustine, employ 
sensory language in order to express their experiences of the divine?
To answer this question, we might come back to the ‘goal’ of a phenom-
enological anthropology of perception (Csordas 1990, 9). If the moment of 
transcendence is that point of ‘existential beginnings’, the point where what 
is experienced in the body meets a being’s relationally constituted experience 
thus far of its life-in-the-world, then perception is what emerges from that 
place. In relational (cultural) contexts that emphasise five senses, Geurts ar-
gues (2003, 56), subjective human experience and perceptual events become 
categorised, formed, in terms of those five sensory channels, the acquisition 
of language aiding in this objectifying process (Ibid.). The implication is, 
of course, that in contexts where different sensory models exist, subjective 
human experience would be formed and expressed differently, something 
that Geurts illustrates through her work with the Anlo-Ewe speaking people 
of West Africa. For the Anlo-Ewe, for whom indigenous bodily understand-
ings reflect ways of being-in-the-world very different from those common 
in many Euro-American contexts, subjective human experience (‘feeling in 
the body’) is, needless to say, conceptualised and expressed without any 
reference to a fivefold model (Ibid., 41). 
With this in mind we may return to Augustine’s description of tasting, 
touching, smelling, hearing, and seeing God with an understanding that 
moves us away from the danger of reifying our notion of the ‘spiritual sens-
es’, yet at the same time allows for an emic perspective of the body and the 
world in which the divine exists and might be tangibly sensed. If Augustine 
spoke of ‘tasting’ God and yet was not referring to something that happens 
in the mouth, we must assume that he was referring to something else. We 
might suggest that, living within the paradigm of a fivefold sensorium, he 
was merely expressing his subjective experience of the divine, what he per-
haps even experienced in the body,6 within the conceptual sensorial terms 
6  I say what he ‘perhaps… experienced in the body’ because it is, of course, possible that 
Augustine is translating experience from a domain other than bodily sensation or sensory 
perception. He may, it is conceivable, be speaking, for example, not so much about perception 
as about desire.
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that were available to him, in other words the language of the five senses. 
At heart, he was translating experience from one domain (his experience 
of God) to another domain (his experience of the senses). He was, in other 
words, making a fundamentally metaphorical move.
Translating experience & experiencing bodies
Lakoff and Johnson (2000[1980]) argue that metaphor – the capacity to under-
stand and experience one kind of thing in terms of another – is central to the 
ways in which we organise our lives. Our conceptual systems, which govern 
our thoughts, actions, and perceptions, are fundamentally metaphorical in 
nature. For the anthropologist James Fernandez (1972), metaphor works by 
connecting two distinct domains of experience, a process that often involves 
relating inchoate experiences to more concrete, observable realms. ‘Thus,’ 
writes Fernandez (1974, 122), ‘in “mercy… droppeth as the gentle rain from 
heaven,” the “gentle rain” gives to the abstract and vaguely conceived 
“mercy” a concreteness that literal definition is hopeless to achieve.’ It is 
important to note here that, from a phenomenological perspective, metaphor 
does not devalue certain spheres of experience as being less ‘real’ than oth-
ers.7 It simply moves or translates one domain into another, often tentatively 
and experimentally, due to the essential untranslatability of phenomena. 
Building from the materials of experience, we imaginatively play with dif-
ferent metaphors, trying and testing their effectiveness to express different 
aspects of that experience, as well as their capacity to situate us in particular 
and desired ways in the world (Kirmayer 1993, 185, 187).
With this in mind I wish to move from a consideration of Dave’s experi-
ence to a consideration of my own experience. Since within anthropology 
the embodied ethnographer is him or herself ‘the research instrument par 
excellence’ (Hammersley & Atkinson 2007, 17), a reflexive exploration of 
one’s own experience and ontological positionality seems an ethical necessity 
when considering the experience and ontological positionality of others, as 
these aspects inevitably, and often tacitly, influence and shape one’s inter-
pretation of the ‘other’s’ world (Ewing 1994). The importance of bringing 
7  For example, to the person experiencing mercy, caught in a trap, embroiled in relationships 
of unequal power and feeling the weight of life-circumstances bearing down upon them, the 
easing, removal or complete dissolution of that weight by an agentive hand (i.e. ‘mercy’) no 
doubt constitutes a very real existential phenomenon. It is this phenomenon, this domain 
of experience, that the subject seeks to express through making a metaphorical appeal to a 
different domain (in this case the dropping of ‘gentle rain from heaven’).
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my own experience into dialogue with that of other research participants 
became clear to me whilst carrying out the doctoral research on which this 
article is based. Since the object of my research was Christian experience, and 
my specific focus was the group of which I had been part for many years, 
the question was not whether I should include my own experience in the 
study, but why I would even consider excluding it, especially in light of the 
fact that reflexive and auto-ethnographic practices have a long-established 
history in anthropology (Okely & Callaway 1992), including many auto-
ethnographic accounts of what might be called ‘extraordinary’ encounters 
(e.g. Stoller & Olkes 1987; Favret-Saada 1980; Turner 1992). Hence, in 2013, 
I embarked on writing an auto-ethnographic account of my own conver-
sion experience, something which had taken place many years earlier, in 
Cambridge in early 1995. The following passage is taken from that account:
…on the first day of the mission, having initially been quite resistant to 
attending the meeting, my ‘heart’ changed throughout the day so that, by 
the early evening, I felt a kind of internal, gently bubbling excitement about 
going, actually a kind of joy. Upon entering the auditorium, my friend and I 
found a place to sit… When the speaker began to talk, I began to listen in a 
way in which I had never listened before. In truth, I found him very easy to 
listen to; he spoke in a calm and mildly humorous way. But my attentiveness 
cannot merely be explained by his agreeable style. Most remarkable to me 
was how much I wanted to listen, how much I wanted to understand the things 
he was talking about. My listening, I found, was centred in a very deep part 
of my body, in a very deep part of my being. My attention was ‘gripped’ in 
a gentle but firm way. Alongside this, there was a feeling of opening out, a 
kind of inner spaciousness that connected me with the spaciousness around 
me. I felt both ‘gripped’ and, at the same time, totally at ease. It was as if the 
very spaciousness in which I found myself was enabling my attention to be 
focused. As this man spoke, it seemed to be bringing not only a change in 
my understanding, of my possible ‘place’ within a new and different story, 
but also a change in how I was experiencing listening itself. Metaphorically, 
if the body were compared to a house, it felt like underground rooms that 
had been shut up and never used before were being opened up, and with 
that came the opening of a different realm of sensory awareness, a different 
capacity to hear. (Barnes 2015, 74f.) 
What I am describing here, from the ‘gently bubbling excitement’ to the feel-
ing of ‘inner spaciousness’ and ‘opening out’, to the sense of attentiveness 
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in ‘a very deep part of my body’, is brought together in my final metaphor 
of the house. In ‘translating abstract bodily feelings into words’ (Hunt & 
Sampson 2006, 21), I am moving experience from one sphere (deeply felt 
bodily sensation) to another sphere (the image of the underground rooms of 
a house being opened up). The interesting connection between this experi-
ence and Dave’s is the appeal that both make to things felt inside the body, 
to sensations within some kind of inner space. With Dave, this comes across 
most strongly in the second metaphor he employs, his description of the 
forgotten jam jar, ‘full of dead fish and green slime’. The key moment, of 
course, is when the jam jar is put under the tap, the tap is turned on, and ‘all 
of this slime just came out of you, and it would sort of peel off, this green 
film which had attached itself to the jam jar, and you’d be left with a clean 
jar’. What appears like a verbal slip – ‘all of this slime just came out of you’ 
– in fact simply highlights the way in which the metaphor is working. Dave 
is connecting different domains of experience in order to convey what he 
felt. Whatever ‘hit’ Dave that morning was something like a powerful jet 
of fresh water (and something like lightning) which somehow went right 
inside him and peeled off a layer of internal ‘slime’. My experience, although 
more gentle and therefore appealing to a different metaphor (underground 
rooms opening up and letting in both light and air), points to a similar shift 
in internal bodily sensation.
From a phenomenological perspective, Tim Ingold (2000b) argues that it 
is only in the appeal that metaphor makes to a shared familiarity of sensory 
experience that it finds its resonance or power. He illustrates this through 
describing what it felt like for him to stand next to a railway crossing just at 
the point that a train raced past. ‘It thundered past me,’ he writes, ‘in a flash.’ 
To convey something of his experience, Ingold connects several different 
sensory domains – the sound, sight, and feel of the train racing past, with the 
sound and feel of thunder, and the shocked visual sensation of lightning. 
The aptness of this metaphor to convey such a highly sensory experience, he 
argues, depends upon a shared familiarity between the speaker and his au-
dience of the sound of thunder and the sight of lightning. In knowing these, 
the listener (or reader in this case) can sense something of the speaker’s (or 
writer’s) experience, even if that same person has never stood by a railway 
track and experienced a train racing past. Ingold is careful to point out that 
what he is speaking about here is more than just a conceptual familiarity. It 
is, rather, a familiarity rooted in personal experience. ‘[I]n having recourse 
to this metaphor,’ Ingold states, ‘it is my experience that I want to convey to 
you, not some conceptual prototype of a “passing train” for which the audi-
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tory and visual sensations of thunder and lightning happen to provide apt 
vehicles of symbolic expression.’ (Ibid., 285) It is, he argues, in connecting 
different domains of experience that people continually forge and re-forge 
the verbal conventions of their society in efforts to make themselves, and 
their own sensory practices and experiences, understood to others (Ibid.). 
Dave, in seeking to convey to me his very real, very tangible experi-
ence, engages in exactly this kind of metaphorical work. The two primary 
metaphors he employs – being struck by lightning and the cleaning out of 
the dirty jam jar – both appeal to an assumed shared familiarity, rightly 
in this case, between him and me of these two different domains of expe-
rience. I am familiar both with experiencing lightning (although, admit-
tedly, not being struck by it) and with the green films of slime that collect 
on the inside of neglected jars. At the same time, these metaphors work, 
they resonate with me, his audience, because of a shared understanding, 
rooted also in my personal experience, of human bodies and the worlds 
they inhabit. In my understanding God is the kind of being that, were one 
to encounter, could certainly engender a feeling in the body similar to be-
ing struck by lightning. And in my own experience, although for the most 
part worked out in gentler ways than the experience Dave describes, the 
Spirit does intrude deep within one’s own being, bringing about a radical 
change. In this way Dave’s metaphors make sense to me, his audience, 
because they appeal to a shared familiarity of bodily experience along-
side similar conceptual understandings and interpretations of that same 
sensory experience.
Speaking bodies
Stories about Jesus present him as a master of metaphor, continually, in 
Fernandez’s terms, connecting his experience of the inchoate (‘heaven’) to 
the more concrete (‘earth’), whilst simultaneously being misunderstood by 
those around him who believe him to be speaking in purely literal terms 
(i.e. with no translation between different spheres). Thus, when Jesus tells 
Nicodemus that he must be ‘born again’, the latter makes no metaphorical 
translation, and understands Jesus to be talking about a literal re-birth.8 ‘How 
can an old man enter a second time into his mother’s womb?’ Nicodemus 
asks incredulously. Similarly, when Jesus meets the Samaritan woman at 
the well,9 he begins to talk to her, through metaphorical translation, about 
8  The story is found in John, chapter 3.
9  The story is found in John, chapter 4.
THE SPEAKING BODY 275
aspects of divine experience which she, throughout the conversation, 
continues to understand in literal terms (i.e. devoid of any translational 
movement). Jesus offers her ‘living water’. She misunderstands, believing 
him to be talking about the physical water in the well. ‘You have nothing 
to draw with, and the well is deep,’ she says. ‘How are you hoping to get 
this “living” water?’
What is pertinent here in terms of my argument thus far is that Jesus 
is using the concrete, physical environment around him to speak about 
more inchoate aspects of divine experience centred in the human body. 
‘Everyone who drinks this (physical) water will thirst again,’ he says, 
‘but the water that I give a person will not only quench all thirst, but will 
become within that person a well of water springing up to eternal life.’ 
The woman – whether deliberately or not – continues to ignore the meta-
phorical movement and to misplace the subject of Jesus’s utterance in the 
external environment, causing Jesus in response to address her ‘heart’, that 
centre of charismatic devotion attached, at present, to a charismatic object 
– a ‘well’ – that promises much, but is failing to deliver to her the waters 
of Life (see Barnes 2015; Shils 1975; Csordas 1997, 138; Eisenstadt 1968, 
xxvi). Jesus, in exposing her attachment to an untrustworthy charismatic 
object, is no doubt prompting her to recognise him as the Christ, a worthy 
charismatic ‘object’, or leader, able to open deep within her own being a 
genuine spring of living water. There is a very real sense in which Jesus, 
through these metaphorical moves, is speaking about the body, through 
the Spirit’s infusion, becoming something new.
If we return to Dave’s and my experiences, we can see these same 
themes of internal transformation emerging. Dave describes himself as 
being ‘completely radicalised within’ and, through his employment of the 
image of fresh water peeling off an inner layer of slime, expresses that this 
experience was deeply cleansing, perhaps cleansing of an inner part of him 
that few other experiences had ever reached. I describe a gently bubbling 
excitement, developing into a deep listening, opening out to an inner spa-
ciousness, which in sum felt like a very deep part of me opening up and 
letting in fresh, clean air. In both cases there is a change within, the very 
thing that Jesus points to through his metaphor about the opening up of a 
deep, internal living spring. And here we can see why Christians like Dave 
and I might find such stories about Jesus so convincing and how they might 
easily become authoritative guides as to how the world is. In this story of 
encounter with a Samaritan woman, and others like it, Jesus seems to point 
to an experience of the body and the world that, in resonating with one’s 
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own experience of the body and the world, appears to remarkably shrink, 
if not collapse, the distance between one’s own lived world and his.10
Expressions of such ‘changes within’ are common within the literature 
dealing with Christian conversion, with metaphors of ‘depth’, the ‘heart’, 
the ‘Spirit’, and the ‘soul’ often being employed to express such experiences 
(see de Witte 2011; Harding 2000, 19, 34; Stromberg 1981; Turner & Turner 
1978, 8; Lootens 2012, 56, 64). For example, William James (1982[1902]), in 
his seminal work on religious experience, amidst a host of similar examples, 
records the following case:
I remember the night, and almost the very spot on the hill-top, where my soul 
opened out, as it were, into the Infinite, and there was a rushing together of 
the two worlds, the inner and the outer. It was deep calling unto deep – the 
deep that my own struggle had opened up within being answered by the 
unfathomable deep without, reaching beyond the stars. (1982, 66.)
Other instances recorded by James speak of a ‘stirring of the heart’ (Ibid., 67); 
the ‘heart bound[ing] in recognition’ at God’s voice (Ibid., 69); an ‘explosion’ 
of joy in ‘the bottom of my soul’ (Ibid., 225); and something happening ‘in 
my interior mind’, whose ‘impressions, more rapid than thought, shook my 
soul’ (Ibid., 226). James relates such experiences to a level of deep, sensed 
intuitions and impulses that fall beneath the level of everyday conscious-
ness. Indeed, writing at the dawn of the twentieth century, he applauds the 
then recent steps in psychology acknowledging a level of sub-conscious 
awareness falling outside what he calls the ‘ordinary field’ (Ibid., 233), 
suggesting that this ‘deep’ sphere of human experience might well be the 
very place that ‘if there be higher spiritual agencies that can directly touch 
us, the psychological condition of there doing so might be our possession 
of a subconscious region which alone should yield access to them’ (Ibid., 
242, italics in original).
The relationship between ‘inner’ experiences and being ‘touched’ by God 
has been dealt with more recently by Marleen de Witte (2011) in her research 
carried out in a Ghanaian charismatic church. As with the cases above, de 
Witte also records expressions of experience formed around metaphors of 
‘inner depth’. One church member tells de Witte, ‘You have to open your 
heart to the Spirit… when the Spirit touches you, you feel it deep deep in-
10  The reason, I would suggest, that neither Nicodemus nor the Samaritan woman initially 
understood Jesus’s metaphorical translations may well have been because there was no 
resonance between Jesus’s experience of his body and the world, and their own. 
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side’ (2011, 491). Such ‘inner’ experiences authenticate, de Witte suggests, a 
particular religious subjectivity (Ibid., 492), but can also be connected to the 
wider social and structural context within which such experiences take place 
(Bourdieu 1990[1980]). Drawing on Meyer’s notion of ‘sensational forms’ 
(2010) alongside work on the disciplining of the senses and the body (e.g. 
Chidester 1992, 2005; Csordas 1997), de Witte is able to account for these 
experiences as being generated by a powerful and complex interplay of 
charismatic performance and ‘encoded, learned bodily behaviour’ (de Witte 
2011, 491). Although appearing immediate and spontaneous, ‘the feeling of 
the Holy Spirit touching,’ de Witte argues, ‘is produced by adopting and 
repeatedly practising certain bodily forms’ (Ibid., 505). As such, De Witte’s 
work raises the question of authenticity. If church members’ experiences 
can be accounted for through the disciplining of the body and the tuning 
of the senses within a particular charismatic regime, then can any of these 
experiences be attributed to a genuine encounter with a divine being?
In a sense de Witte leaves this question unanswered, or perhaps, even, 
unasked. The theoretical framework she sets up is, indeed, particularly 
convincing when applied to what William James might call ‘excited as-
semblies’ where ‘suggestion and imitation’, as James (1982, 229) puts it in 
a far less theoretically developed way, undoubtedly play a significant role 
in engendering experience.11 And yet, because it is convincing, this same 
framework obscures the aspect that, for me, is the most interesting – human 
beings’ actual engagement and interaction with the divine. Since everything 
may be accounted for through a process of learned embodiment, God – as 
an actual living being – appears strangely absent from the Ghanaian church 
setting that de Witte describes. Is this actually the case? Or is this merely 
the impression created by the analytic frame through which we are invited 
to perceive this other world? 
Following Merleau-Ponty’s idea that perception starts in the body and 
ends in objects, I have suggested that people put their particular ontologi-
11  De Witte deals with more ‘excited’ and less ‘excited’ assemblies in this article, using the 
same theoretical framework. However, the framework would seem less powerful in explaining 
certain unpremeditated experiences such as, for example, that of President Finney, recorded 
by James (1982, 255): ‘[A]s I turned and was about to take a seat by the fire, I received a mighty 
baptism of the Holy Ghost. Without any expectation of it, without ever having the thought 
in my mind that there was any such thing for me, without any recollection that I had ever 
heard the thing mentioned by any person in the world, the Holy Spirit descended upon me 
in a manner that seemed to go through me, body and soul. I could feel the impression, like a 
wave of electricity, going through and through me. Indeed, it seemed to come in waves and 
waves of liquid love; for I could not express it in any other way. It seemed like the very breath 
of God. I can recollect distinctly that it seemed to fan me, like immense wings.’ 
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cal mark upon the world by interpreting bodily sensations in particular 
ways (something as true for anthropologists as for anyone else). As such, 
metaphorical translation of experience from one domain to another is by 
no means a neutral process, but is also a rhetorical, agentive construction 
of the world as one imagines, hopes, and wishes it to be. Following this, it 
stands to reason that Dave could have explained what happened to him in 
that morning prayer meeting in completely different terms from the way he 
did, or could even now re-interpret his experience, thus producing different 
‘objects’ and a different ‘world’ in which to live. When Dave arrived at the 
prayer meeting he was, in fact, feeling ‘physically sick’ and ‘exhausted’ from 
a series of late nights and early starts. At the same time, he arrived with a 
sense of expectation, even urgency about what might happen:
I had this sense of, ‘Oh dear me, this is the last day of the week.’ I was actu-
ally on holiday for two weeks, and this was the end of the first week. And 
I think I just had this sense within me that something was going to happen 
today. And I went in, and literally within minutes of sitting down I felt God 
speak to me.
‘In what way?’ I ask.
Well, through tongues and interpretation of tongues – which was not spoken, 
‘David Webb, blah, blah, blah.’ It was spoken out into the meeting. And for 
the next hour I sat there sweating my pants off really, because I didn’t really 
know quite what to do, or how to respond. But I knew that in some way I 
needed to. And so, round about an hour later, coming up to eight o’clock, 
if I’m not mistaken, there was another sort of prophetic type word. And at 
that point, I knew that I needed to respond. And there was a guy called Mr 
Harrison, who was one of the older men there…
Here we see what happened in the run up to Dave’s ‘lightning’ experience. 
It is not difficult to draw out from this an embodied psychological drama 
that explains his experience without requiring any reference to God as a 
living agent. Dave arrives somewhat disorientated (tired, feeling physically 
sick etc.) and, at the same time, with a pressing sense of urgent anticipation 
(his time at the camp is running out). He is ‘open’ to something happening, 
and seems to be almost willing it. It is within this context that something 
does happen (a ‘word’ spoken out into the meeting) that Dave interprets as 
God speaking to him. In Merleau-Ponty’s terms, perception (hearing the 
voice of another person) ends in an object (God). It seems also that the voice, 
whatever it said, has invited a response that sets Dave on edge (‘sweating 
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[his] pants off’) for the next hour. The tension increases. Another person 
speaks. One of the older, authority figures in the room affirms that God is 
speaking, further concretising God as an object present in the gathering. 
Dave responds to this man’s instructions, the two young guys come run-
ning across, lay hands on him, and (bang!) lightning. Dave, through his 
own expectations and the charged social environment in which he found 
himself, was ‘set up’ for just such an embodied experience. His ‘encounter’ 
can be explained in these terms.
But this, of course, is not Dave’s explanation of these events, nor for that 
matter my own. As stated, the Christian subject puts his or her particular 
mark on the world by proclaiming that what he or she has sensed in the body 
is God, and in so doing constructs not only the world perceived but also the 
body that perceives it. And this brings us back to a crucial point. The body, 
as we have seen, speaks. But what kind of body is it that is speaking? From 
an etic perspective, Christian conversions such as Dave’s or mine, have often 
been explained in terms apart from any ontological transformation within 
the body itself. Therefore, Stromberg (1993) points to the reconciliation of 
psychological anomalies through conversion narratives; Harding (2000) 
attributes conversion in large part to a shift in language; and even Csordas 
(1990, 23) explains aspects of divine experience as the product of the ‘so-
cially informed body’ rather than the product of any subjective experience 
of God. An emic perspective, on the other hand, explains the conversion 
experience as an ‘encounter’, a meeting with a divine Being that results in the 
ontological transformation of the body itself, the opening up of an internal 
‘spring’ (the Spirit) that was simply not open before that moment in quite 
the same way. The body, essentially, is transformed into something new. 
And it is this body, the body that is open to domains of divine experience, 
that speaks, often employing metaphor to translate that experience into 
more familiar realms. 
Conclusion
More than a hundred years ago William James took up this same issue of 
the new body in his work on, for the most part Christian, conversion. He 
thought it was ‘natural’ that those experiencing the kind of phenomena 
I have explored here could well come away feeling that they had been 
worked on by a higher power, warranting their subjective belief ‘in a radi-
cally new substantial nature’ (1982, 228). Drawing on the cases available to 
him, James identified several repeated themes within this transition, one of 
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which was ‘an objective change which the world often appears to undergo’ 
(Ibid., 248). As I have shown in this article, on the one hand this change 
relates to ontology or being, as exemplified in the words James quotes from 
Joseph Alleine, the New England Puritan: ‘the sincere Christian is quite a 
new fabric, from the foundation to the top-stone. He is a new man, a new 
creature’ (Ibid., 228). On the other, it relates to perceiving, as exemplified in 
the words of Jonathan Edwards, the revivalist preacher: ‘…it follows that… 
there are [also] new perceptions and sensations entirely different in their 
nature and kind from anything experienced by the [same] saints before they 
were sanctified’ (quoted in Ibid., 229).
The issue of radically different natures has surfaced more recently in 
anthropological thought through a growing body of work associated with 
what has come to be known as the ‘ontological turn’, which argues that 
ontologies, worlds, and natures give us better tools to think with than the 
previously popular anthropological concept of ‘culture’ (Holbraad et al. 
2010). In this vein Mario Blaser argues that the employment of the culture 
concept is the product of a particular trajectory of modernity that obscures or 
denies radical difference through a process of what he calls ‘Sameing’ (Blaser 
2013, 549; see also Blaser 2009a, 2009b; Descola 2013). This process works, 
Blaser explains, because the ontology of modernity, and of Euro-modernity 
in particular, is built on a fundamental distinction between Culture (a realm 
of human creation) and Nature (a realm of existing things), within which 
the concept of culture tames radically different worlds by explaining their 
difference as merely ‘cultural perspectives’ upon a single, pre-existent re-
ality.12 In place of ‘culture’, the ‘ontologists’ (Bessire & Bond 2014) propose 
tackling the differences usually apprehended as cultural in a more radical 
way, in other words in terms of ontologies being played out amongst, at 
times, incommensurable worlds (Blaser 2013, 565; Holbraad 2012). 
My approach here, in taking up Csordas’s theory of the body as the 
‘existential ground’ not just of ‘culture’ but of ontology, has been to seek to 
embed ontology in experience and, in so doing, to show how both bodies 
and worlds emerge out of perception. Through a focus on philosophical 
and conceptual solutions to alterity, to quite literally thinking through things 
(Henare, Holbraad & Wastell 2007), one of the weaknesses of ontological 
approaches thus far has been their avoidance of considering the role that 
phenomenological aspects of experience play in the perception, perfor-
12  ‘There is,’ Vigh and Sausdal (2014) explain, ‘in the ontological turn, not one nature (human) 
and many cultures (people), but many worlds of separate and incommensurable ontologies, 
or “multiple natures”, as Viveiros de Castro terms it.’ (See Viveiros de Castro 1998; 2011; 2015)
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mance, and constitution of various worlds (Mitchell 2015). In employing a 
phenomenological method, I have sought to highlight an embodied, experi-
ential, and subjective approach to ontology that explores the ways in which 
different embodied knowledges and worlds come into being. If perception 
starts in the body and ends in objects, this is certainly not to say that there 
are no ‘things’ out there in the world to sense, but it is rather to highlight the 
way in which different lived worlds emerge through the perceptual process.
In line with what William James observed, for both Dave and me our 
conversions marked distinctive turning points in our lives when certain 
modes of perception came alive to us. Two years after my interview with 
Dave, and when I was writing about and reflecting upon my own conver-
sion experience, I raised this point with him in conversation. Did he feel (as 
I did) that the way he experienced his body before and after his conversion 
was somehow different? He responded by saying that he had no doubt 
that this was the case. We might attribute this to a process of socialisation, 
a learning of a charismatic habitus or encoded bodily behaviour that both 
engenders experience and teaches a person how to read bodily sensations 
in particular ways, and through this bring God, as an object, into one’s 
landscape of that-which-is (Csordas 1990; de Witte 2011; Luhrmann 2012). 
However, for many of us such explanations are insufficient. They fail to 
resonate with what we understand the world to contain, nor do they take 
full account of experiences that, when they took place, surprised us because 
they were unpremeditated, unusual, or out-of-place: experiences which hap-
pened, in President Finney’s words, ‘[w]ithout any expectation… without 
ever having the thought in [our] mind[s] that there was any such thing.’ 
(Quoted in James 1982, 255.)
Each time the body speaks it makes its world anew. Caught on the cusp 
between past experience, its experience-thus-far-of-life-in-the-world, and a 
nascent world in large part brought into being by the body’s own articula-
tions, the speaking body negotiates a path that it also bears responsibility 
for forming. In so doing, worlds are created, objects are formed in Merleau-
Ponty’s terms. Included within this process of objectification is the body 
that is speaking. If, as social actors seem to claim, the body is transformed 
into something new through conversion-type experiences such as the ones 
explored here, this raises the question of how we might conceptualise such 
ontological transformations. Social actors, as I hope to have shown, de-
velop their own solutions to this problem. In seeking to conceptualise and 
articulate their experiences they often metaphorically translate them into 
different spheres, a process that reveals assumptions both about the world 
JAMIE BARNES282
(for example the ‘things’ it contains) and the body (for example its sensory 
‘capacities’) that inhabits it. In this light one of the metaphorical themes 
that emerges in the examples addressed here is that of divine experiences 
as they relate to notions of existential ‘depth’. This raises questions for 
further investigation: not only the question of the significance and role of 
phenomenologically ‘deep’ experiences in shifting an individual’s ontology, 
but also the question of whether the body occupying such spheres of divine 
experience is experientially and ontologically different from other types of 
experiencing bodies, and, if so, in what ways?
* * *
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